This paper investigates independent set games (introduced by Deng et al., Math. Oper. Res., 24:751-766, 1999 [4]), which belong to cooperative profit games. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph and α(G) be the size of maximum independent sets in G. For any F ⊆ E, V F denotes the set of vertices incident only to edges in F , and G[V F ] denotes the induced subgraph on V F . An independent set game on G is a cooperative game Γ G = (E, γ), where E is the set of players and γ : 2 E → R is the characteristic function such that γ
Introduction
Cooperative games form an important class of problems in game theory, which have a lot of applications in economics, computer science, and mathematics. Formally, a cooperative game Γ is a pair properties of convex (or concave) games involving other solution concepts. Hence the convexity (or concavity) of cooperative games has attracted a lot of research efforts. Many results on the convexity (or concavity) concern combinatorial optimization games, which are cooperative games arising from combinatorial optimization problems, e.g., airport games, bankruptcy games, communication games, traveling salesman games, and spanning tree games. However, only a few combinatorial optimization games are universally convex (or concave) [2, 3, 7, 12] . Hence one working direction is to characterize the condition of combinatorial optimization games being convex (or concave).
There is a line of research in which the convexity (or concavity) of a combinatorial optimization game is characterized by the property of its underlying graph. Van den Nouweland and Borm [18] showed that communication vertex games are convex if and only if the underlying graph is cycle-complete and communication arc games are convex if and only if the underlying graph is cycle-free. Herer and Penn [8] showed that Steiner traveling salesman games are concave if the underlying graph is a 1-sum of K 4 and outerplanar graphs. Hamers [6] showed that Chinese postman games are concave if the underlying graph is weakly cyclic. Okamoto [14] showed that vertex cover games are concave if and only if the underlying graph is (K 3 , P 3 )-free, and coloring games are concave if and only if the underlying graph is complete multipartite. Based on the result of Hamers [6] , Albizuri and Hamers [1] characterized the concavity of some variants of Chinese postman games. Kobayashi and Okamoto [9] initialized the study for the concavity of spanning tree games, where a sufficient condition and a necessary condition were given separately. Koh and Sanità [10] proposed the first complete characterization for the concavity of spanning tree games, which efficiently recognizes concave instances of spanning tree games. Platz [15] gave a complete characterization for the concavity of multi-depot Steiner traveling salesman games.
In this work, we focus on characterizing the convexity of independent set games. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce definitions, notations and related results. In Section 3, we present a complete characterization for the convexity of independent set games. Our characterization immediately yields a polynomial time algorithm for recognizing convex instances of independent set games. In Section 4, we introduce two relaxations of independent set games and present complete characterizations for their convexity respectively. Section 5 concludes the results in this paper and discusses the directions of future work.
Preliminaries

Graphs
We assume that the readers have a moderate familiarity with graphs. However, some notions and notations used in this paper should be clarified before proceeding. Throughout, a graph is always finite, undirected and simple. For n ∈ N, we use K n to denote the complete graph with n vertices, use K 1,n to denote the graph which is a star, i.e., a complete bipartite graph where one partition has 1 vertex and the other partition has n vertices, use C n to denote the graph which is a cycle with n edges, and use P n to denote the graph which is a path with n edges. Since K 2 is isomorphic to K 1,1 and P 2 is isomorphic to K 1,2 , both K 2 and P 2 are stars. Let H be a graph. We use V (H) to denote the vertex set of H and use E(H) to denote the edge set of H. A graph is said H-free
denotes the set of vertices adjacent to v, δ G (v) denotes the set of edges incident to v, and d G (v) denotes the degree of v. A vertex is isolated if it is a vertex with degree zero, i.e., it is not an endpoint of any edge. A vertex is pendant if it is a vertex with degree one. An edge is pendant if it is incident to a pendant vertex. For any U ⊆ V , G[U ] denotes the induced subgraph of G. In particular, G[∅] is an empty graph which has no vertex. For any F ⊆ E, V F denotes the set of vertices incident only to edges in F , V [F ] denotes the set of vertices incident to edges in F , and G[F ] denotes the edge-induced subgraph (V [F ], F ) of G, i.e., the subgraph of G spanned by F . An independent set of G is a vertex set U ⊆ V such that G[U ] has no edge. We use α(G) to denote the size of maximum independent sets in G. An edge cover of G is an edge set F ⊆ E such that every vertex of G is incident to at least one edge in F . We use ρ(G) to denote the size of minimum edge covers in G. It is well known that α(G) ≤ ρ(G) for any graph G.
Cooperative games
Let Γ = (N, γ) be a cooperative game, where N is the set of players and γ : 2 N → R is the characterizatic function with γ(∅) = 0. A subset S of N is called a coalition, and N is called the grand coalition. For each coalition S, γ(S) represents the profit received by the players in S. We call Γ convex if for any S, T ⊆ N , 1) or equivalently, for any i ∈ N and any S ⊆ T ⊆ N \{i}, A profit allocation of Γ is a vector x ∈ R |N | which consists of proposed amounts to be received by players in N . A profit allocation x is called efficient if i∈N x i = γ(N ), and called group rational
if i∈S x i ≥ γ(S) for any S ⊆ N . In particular, x is called individual rational if x i ≥ γ({i}) for any i ∈ N . An imputation of Γ is a profit allocation that is efficient and individual rational. The core of Γ is the set of imputations that are group rational. The core of cooperative games may be empty. We call Γ balanced if the core is non-empty, and totally balanced if each subgame is balanced. Clearly, totally balanced games are balanced. Moreover, totally balanced games contain convex games as a special subclass.
Theorem 2.1 (Shapley [16] ). Convex cooperative games are totally balanced.
Independent set games
Let G = (V, E) be a graph. An independent set game on G is a cooperative game Γ G = (E, γ), where E is the set of players and γ : 2 E → N is the characteristic function such that
where V F is the set of vertices incident only to edges in F . Clearly, γ(∅) = α(G[∅]) = 0. To make sure the independent set game is well-defined, we always assume the underlying graph has no isolated vertex.
Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [4] introduced independent set games, studied the algorithmic aspect of the core, and gave a complete characterization for the balancedness. We remark that (non-)pendant vertices (resp. edges) always refer to vertices (resp. edges) in the underlying graph G of independent set game Γ G in this section. Before proving Theorem 3.1, we investigate some properties of independent set games first. Let G = (V, E) be a graph without isolated vertices and Γ G = (E, γ) be an independent set game on G. Take an edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } ∈ E and an edge set F ⊆ E\{e}. For simplicity, denote F ∪{e} by F ′ . We have the following observations for the independent set game Γ G on G.
Proof. Since e ∈ F , the endpoints u 1 and u 2 of e are not in V F .
Notice that any two vertices in I F are not
Lemma 3.6. If e is a pendant edge in G, then γ(F ′ ) = γ(F ) + 1.
Since e is a pendant edge, we may assume that u 1 is a pendant vertex to which e is incident. It follows that
In the following, we distinguish two cases of V F ′ .
Since
Assume to the contrary that
Due to the maximality of I F , we have
, which contradicts the maximality of I F ′ . Besides, I F ′ contains at most one of u 1 and u 2 , as they are adjacent in G[V F ′ ]. Since u 1 is a pendant vertex in G, we may always assume that u 1 ∈ I F ′ (by replacing u 2 with u 1 in I F ′ when necessary). By Lemma 3.3,
Without loss of generality, assume V F ′ = V F . Otherwise, by Lemma 3.5, γ(F ′ ) = γ(F ) follows.
and e is not a pendant edge, we may always denote the endpoint of e in I F ′ by u 1 , i.e., u 1 ∈ I F ′ . By Lemma 3.3,
With all these preparations above, we are ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We first prove the "only if" part. Assume to the contrary that there is a non-pendant edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } in G which is not incident to a pendant edge, i.e., d G (v) ≥ 2 for any v ∈ N G (u 1 ) ∪ N G (u 2 ). Let W u 1 u 2 denote the set of vertices from N G (u 1 ) ∩ N G (u 2 ) with degree two, i.e., W u 1 u 2 = {w ∈ N G (u 1 ) ∩ N G (u 2 ) : d G (w) = 2}. We proceed by distinguishing two cases of the cardinality of W u 1 u 2 .
We remark that the following arguments hold for i = 1, 2.
Then the cardinality discussion of W u i w * boils down to Case 1, which contradicts the convexity of Γ G . Therefore, either case leads to a contradiction. We conclude that every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge in G. (a) Let I S ′ be a maximum independent set in G[V S ′ ]. We prove by contradiction that I S ′ contains an endpoint of e which is not adjacent to a pendant vertex. In particular, we derive a contradiction by constructing an independent set of G[V S ] from I S ′ , the size of which is as large as that of I S ′ . Our discussion in this part is mainly based on equality (3.3).
Since e is not a pendant edge, we may always denote the endpoint of e in I S ′ by u 1 .
• u 1 is not adjacent to a pendant vertex.
We show that d G (v) ≥ 2 for any v ∈ N G (u 1 ). Assume to the contrary that there is a vertex v * in N G (u 1 ) such that d G (v * ) = 1. It follows that {u 1 , v * } is a pendant edge. Since e is not a pendant edge, v * is not incident to e. Thus, {u 1 , v * } is an edge in δ G (u 1 )\{e}. Further notice that
We prove by contradiction that Γ G is convex. In particular, we derive a contradiction by constructing an independent set of G[V T ′ ] with u 1 from I T , the size which is larger than that of I T . Our discussion in this part is mainly based on equality (3.4) . • Every vertex in I T ∩ N G (u 1 ) is adjacent to a pendant vertex in V T .
Since u 1 is not adjacent to a pendant vertex, every vertex in I T ∩ N G (u 1 ) is adjacent to a pendant vertex. Further notice that every pendant vertex which is adjacent to a vertex in V T is also a vertex in V T . Hence every pendant vertex which is adjacent to a vertex in
We prove the convexity of Γ G by contradiction, where we construct an independent set of Therefore, Γ G is convex.
Recall that we propose to call a cooperative game that is both convex and concave a linear game. It turns out that Theorem 3.1 can be strengthened to obtain a complete characterization for the linearity of independent set games. for any F ⊆ E. It turns out that the two relaxations of independent set games share the same structure for convexity. Our proof relies on the the following lemma, which was first proved in [14] .
For the sake of completeness, we also include the proof here. (i) G is (K 3 ,P 3 )-free.
(ii)Γ G is convex.
Proof. We prove the implications (ii) ⇒ (i) and (iii) ⇒ (i) in part (a), and prove the implications (i) ⇒ (ii) and (i) ⇒ (iii) in part (b). As we shall see, our proof implies stronger results.
(a) We show that neitherΓ G norΓ G is convex when G is not (K 3 , P 3 )-free.
We first prove that any subgraph isomorphic to K 3 gives rise to non-convex instances ofΓ G andΓ G . Let H be a subgraph isomorphic to which contradict the convexity ofΓ G andΓ G respectively. Now we prove that any subgraph isomorphic to P 3 results in non-convex instances ofΓ G and Γ G . We may further assume that G has no subgraph isomorphic to (i) G is (K 3 ,P 3 )-free.
(ii)Γ G is linear.
(iii)Γ G is linear.
Since every (K 3 
Conclusions
Efficient characterizations for the convexity of several independent set games are given in this paper.
We show that an independent set game is convex if and only if every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge in the underlying graph. Our characterization yields an efficient algorithm for recognizing the convexity of independent set games. We also introduce two relaxations of independent set games and characterize their convexity respectively.
Notice that the independent set game introduced by Deng et al. [4] admits complete characterizations on the balancedness (cf. Theorem 2.2) and on the convexity (cf. Theorem 3.1) respectively.
A possible direction for future work is to give a complete characterization on the total balancedness.
Characterizations on the (total) balancedness of intermediate and relaxed independent set games will also be interesting.
